Privacy

What it does with your data

Short version: nothing you didn't ask for. Everything happens on this Mac — a local store, and no network calls except the one you can switch on.

It never phones home

No sync service, no accounts, no analytics, no crash reporting — the text recognition and translation run on your Mac. It makes exactly one kind of network request, and only if you ask: an anonymous daily read of the public releases page, off by default, which tells you a new version exists and never installs anything itself.

It skips your passwords

Copies marked confidential by password managers are ignored, and card numbers are filtered out of what it reads. An API key or a one-time code is recognised and kept encrypted — sealed with a key in the Secure Enclave that never leaves this Mac — and asking for one back needs Touch ID. You can lock the whole history behind Touch ID, too.

It asks for almost nothing

No Screen Recording, no Input Monitoring. Folder access only for the screenshot folder and the notes folder you choose, and only if you use those features. Calendar access is write-only: it can add an event and cannot read one.

It forgets on a schedule

The newest 5,000 clips are kept and anything older than 90 days is swept away. Both numbers are yours to change, up to Unlimited and a year, and Clear All History is one menu item. Pinned clips are exempt from the sweep.

On this Mac

  • The store is owner-only, at ~/Library/Application Support/app.memoryclip/ — directory 0700, files 0600.
  • Password managers are skipped: the standard pasteboard opt-out markers (org.nspasteboard.TransientType, AutoGeneratedType, ConcealedType), and known credential apps outright.
  • Any app you name is skipped too — Settings → Privacy → Excluded apps. Nothing copied there reaches the store at all, and unlike the built-in list it keeps applying even with sensitive-content filtering switched off.
  • Card numbers are never captured — Luhn-validated numbers are dropped from plain text, rich text, OCR output and translations alike.
  • Detection is app-identity based: bundle identifier and name, never window titles or the screen, which is why no Screen Recording grant is needed.
  • The model and the translator are local. Foundation Models and Translation run on-device with no cloud fallback.
  • Notes leave the store on purpose — a note is a file in your folder, with that folder's permissions rather than the store's 0600.
  • Optional Touch ID lock gates the panel, redacts the dropdown to clip kinds, and always re-authenticates for Export and Clear All History.

The one network call

Settings → General → Updates has a switch, offered again on its own page of the first-run tour.

  • Off by default. With it off, MemoryClip makes no network calls at all.
  • On, it asks api.github.com once a day what the newest release is. The request is an unauthenticated GET of a public endpoint carrying no identifier of any kind; the only thing GitHub learns is that some address asked.
  • If there is something newer you get one notification — once per version, not once a day until you give in. Take it and MemoryClip downloads that release's .dmg to a temporary folder and opens it, leaving you the same drag onto /Applications as the first install.
  • It never installs anything itself. This app is ad-hoc signed, so a silent self-replacing updater would be asking you to trust a binary swap you never saw.

Secrets

Copy an API key, a private key, a token, a connection string or a one-time code and MemoryClip recognises it — the whole clip has to match a pattern, so a password inside a paragraph is left alone — and, by default, keeps it encrypted: the row in your history holds only ciphertext, sealed with a P-256 key that lives in this Mac's Secure Enclave and can never leave it (ephemeral key agreement, HKDF-SHA256, AES-GCM). The card shows a lock, a label and a mask — which is also all that search can match — and the value behind it asks for Touch ID or your password before it is shown or pasted. One authentication covers 60 seconds of reveals.

Two alternatives live in Settings → Privacy → Secrets: Don't keep it drops the clip entirely, and Keep it like any other clip turns the feature off. Right-click → Not a Secret unseals a false positive once, and Mark as Secret seals an ordinary clip you already have.

A reveal lasts 30 seconds and relocks on Esc or on changing clips; a concealed paste is wiped from the clipboard 90 seconds later (both switchable). One-time codes — recognised only in Messages and Mail — delete themselves after ten minutes unless pinned. Exported histories omit secret rows entirely and the export dialog says how many were left out.

What this protects against: a copied store directory, a Time Machine backup, another process reading the SwiftData file — everywhere the ciphertext goes, the key stays in the enclave. What it does not: malware running as you while a secret is revealed, the clipboard for the 90 seconds a pasted secret lives there, secrets copied while plaintext mode was selected, and a move to another Mac — the enclave key cannot leave this one, so sealed history does not follow you.

Permissions

None for the core job: capture, store, search, and copy clips back. No Screen Recording, no Input Monitoring, no network. Optional, and only with the matching feature:

  • Notifications — for the banner an automatic calendar event posts, and the one the update check posts when a newer release exists. Asked for at the first banner, never at launch.
  • Files and folders — to read your screenshot folder and write notes into the one you pick. Each grant is kept as a security-scoped bookmark rather than a path, and MemoryClip never reaches into a folder you did not point it at.
  • Automation — only when Apple Notes is your note destination.
  • Calendars — only to add an event you asked for. The grant requested is write-only: it can create events and cannot read one.
  • Accessibility — only to auto-paste with a synthetic ⌘V. Without it the clip still reaches the clipboard.

Shortcuts and Spotlight reach the history through four read-only App Intents, and secret clips are invisible to them — a secret never appears in an answer, not even as a masked row.

Every line of the source is public: read it on GitHub.